Controlling Agencies through the President’s Budget Process by Pasachoff, Eloise
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2018 
Controlling Agencies through the President’s Budget Process 
Eloise Pasachoff 
Georgetown University Law Center, eloise.pasachoff@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2049 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152575 
 
Eloise Pasachoff, Controlling Agencies through the President’s Budget Process, Admin. & Reg. 
L. News, Winter 2018, at 8-10. 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
ACADEMIC SPOTLIGHT: SECTION SCHOLARSHIP AWARD WINNERS
Administrative & Regulatory Law News Volume 43, Number 28
Controlling Agencies through  
the President’s Budget Process
By Eloise Pasachoff*
I t is obvious that the federal budget is central to the functioning of the administrative state. But a critical 
element about the federal 
budget is often missing from 
analyses of both the budget 
and the administrative state 
more generally: the way the 
President’s budget process—
the year-round, continuous 
process of developing the 
new budget while execut-
ing the last one—provides 
a major source of control 
over agency policy choices, regardless 
of whether or how much Congress 
eventually appropriates at all. Schol-
ars, practitioners, and observers of 
the administrative state ought to 
acknowledge this reality and consider 
its implications.
In the administrative law literature, 
OMB is often referred to inter-
changeably with OIRA, the Office  
of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs. The idea behind that 
interchangeability is that review of 
regulations is the key tool for central-
ized control of agency policymaking. 
But OIRA is only one office within 
OMB, with only around 45 of the 
435 OMB employees. Almost half 
of OMB’s employees work in the 
“Resource Management Offices” 
(RMOs), five subject-matter-focused 
offices on OMB’s “budget side” that 
collectively are more than four times 
as big as OIRA. See OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET 
11 (2015).
OIRA is often jokingly called the 
most important government 
office you’ve never heard of, 
because of its outsized but 
secretive role in overseeing 
regulations. But the RMOs 
surely vie for that title. Their 
pervasive role overseeing 
agencies’ work on policy 
choices and implementation 
associated with the budget 
and management is even 
less well known than OIRA’s work 
is. And in some sense, the RMOs 
oversee even more of the federal 
executive establishment than OIRA 
does. In part, this is because most 
independent agencies run their 
budgets through OMB, whereas they 
are not subject to OIRA’s regulatory 
review process. But in large part, this 
is just because money really matters 
for setting policy choices. As one 
former political appointee in charge 
of an RMO has explained, “You sit at 
the pure epicenter of policy. You’re in 
a position to make a difference. And 
eventually, everything will come 
across your desk.” Gordon Adams, 
The Office of Management and Budget: 
The President’s Policy Tool, in THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE: 
NAVIGATING THE LABYRINTH 58 
(Roger Z. George & Harvey 
Rishikof eds., 2011).
What are the ways in which the 
RMOs exert their inf luence? For 
each component of the executive 
budget process—the preparation of 
the President’s budget, the execution 
of the budget that Congress eventu-
ally passes and the President signs, and 
the implementation of presidential 
management initiatives that are 
embedded in the budget—the RMOs 
have a series of levers that function as 
a form of policy control.
During budget preparation, when 
agencies are working with OMB to 
put together their budget requests 
for Congress, three levers for control 
exist. Through the form-and-content 
lever, OMB sets ex ante requirements 
for the budget and policy proposals 
that agencies must submit for OMB’s 
review. In other words, OMB tells 
agencies what they should put in their 
budget requests in the first place (the 
content) and how they should convey 
this information (the form).
A second lever during budget 
preparation is the approval lever, under 
which agencies must get OMB 
approval for their budget requests. 
Using this lever, OMB tells agencies 
how their initial budget proposals 
must be modified before they can 
be transmitted to Congress. The 
approval lever functions both at a 
broad level, securing overall agency 
compliance with the President’s 
general policy preferences, and at a 
narrow level, governing budget and 
policy choices in discrete line items.
The third lever during budget 
preparation is the confidentiality lever. 
Under this lever, agency officials are 
not allowed to talk about requests 
that the agency made that OMB 
denied. The confidentiality lever 
limits agencies’ ability to state 
publicly their own views of alterna-
tive budget and policy priorities.
OMB continues its inf luence over 
agency action during budget execu-
tion. Under the specification lever, the 
RMOs “apportion” and otherwise 
define how agencies spend the funds 
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Congress has appropriated. This is 
a formal lever with tools set forth in 
law, such as in the Anti-Deficiency 
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (2012). The 
other lever relevant to budget execu-
tion is more informal: the monitoring 
lever, under which OMB, with indi-
vidual RMO staff members assigned 
to each agency, oversees the ongoing 
work of that agency through regular 
communication.
OMB also uses the executive 
budget process to implement govern-
ment-wide management initiatives, 
which are often more substantive 
than technical. President Bush’s faith-
based initiative, for example, found 
expression through the management 
side of OMB. There are two levers 
for control at work during manage-
ment implementation. One is the 
presidential management agenda lever, 
where management initiatives either 
explicitly contemplate substantive 
policy choices or implicitly lead to 
them. The other is the budget-nexus 
lever, where the budget documents 
themselves require implementation of 
management initiatives.
Collectively, these seven levers 
provide a great deal of control 
over the administrative state. Is it 
presidential control? It depends. On 
the one hand, because of the RMOs’ 
direct line into agencies, this process 
provides a ready way to communicate 
presidential (and OMB director) 
direction. On the other hand, because 
of the deep programmatic knowledge 
and frequent longevity of RMO staff, 
conversations with expert RMO staff 
can often affect what the President 
and OMB director decide. In these 
circumstances, the RMO views help 
shape presidential control. Moreover, 
many RMO decisions do not require 
elevation to more senior political 
appointees at all, and so from the 
agency perspective, RMO direction 
can often feel less like presidential 
control and more like control by the 
RMO staff member with the agency 
relationship.
What ought we to make of the 
RMOs’ expansive work? There are 
many good things about this process, 
not the least of which is that it is 
undoubtedly legal. This might sound 
like faint praise, but given the perpet-
ual questions about the legal basis for 
OIRA’s decision-making authority, it 
is no small matter. More substantively, 
the RMOs provide a valuable service 
in coordinating across the vast execu-
tive establishment, thereby promoting 
efficiency. In addition, given the high 
caliber of RMO staff members, deci-
sions may often be better along some 
metrics than had agencies chosen on 
their own.
However, there is also cause for 
concern about the way OMB exerts 
its control through the executive 
budget process. Three different 
accountability issues arise. First, 
there is a lack of transparency in the 
way the RMOs’ work is conducted. 
There is a great deal that we do not 
know about the day-to-day process 
of this work and about the substance 
of policy ideas that OMB rejected. 
OMB offers two rationales for 
this lack of transparency, but both 
responses are over-inclusive. OMB’s 
claim for “policy consistency from 
the executive branch,” OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11, 
PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND 
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2014), 
§ 22.3, at 2, for example, should 
not necessarily demand a f iction 
that there was never any internal 
disagreement. Relatedly, OMB’s 
claim that confidentiality is needed  
to protect the deliberative process, 
id. at § 22.5, at 3, should not neces-
sarily require secrecy about all of the 
procedural steps—such as who met 
with whom, when, and about what. 
That kind of information could let 
the public assess potential capture 
problems. Greater transparency could 
also deter one-sided dealing through 
the budget process.
The second accountability problem 
is that the RMOs’ work can elevate 
OMB’s civil servants and lower-level 
political appointees over Senate-
confirmed agency off icials, and the 
ultimate lines of responsibility are 
not well defined. The staff in the 
RMOs can exert a lot of control 
throughout the budget process, and 
political actors in the agencies cannot 
elevate everything to political off i-
cials at OMB and the White House 
without losing credibility. But the 
lack of transparency with which the 
civil servants interact with agency 
off icials means that everyone can 
avoid accountability when need be. 
The RMOs’ work is so behind-the-
scenes that no one really talks about 
it, much less calls them to account 
for it. The confidentiality lever limits 
agency off icials from saying what 
they want to say. And the President 
can use this system to distance 
himself from hard decisions.
The third accountability problem is 
that the RMOs’ work on the budget 
can seem very technocratic, and 
that perception can obscure value-
driven or partisan decision making. 
Values-based decision making is 
perfectly valid for a budget; in fact, 
one common definition of a budget 
document is that it is a statement of 
“For each component of the 
executive budget process … 
the RMOs have a series 
of levers that function as a 
form of policy control.” 
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values. But sometimes the budget can 
be portrayed or perceived as a “just 
the facts” document, obscuring the 
fact that real choices based on values 
are being made. Decisions that are 
being made on the basis of values can 
be masked with technocratic rhetoric.
All three of these issues make 
it difficult for Congress and the 
American public to hold anyone 
accountable for these decisions—
agencies, OMB, and the White 
House more generally. How, then, to 
respond to these problems, keeping 
what is good about the RMOs’ work 
while at the same time increasing 
accountability?
Some reforms are possible inside 
the executive branch itself (for an 
administration that wishes to make 
them). For example, presidents could 
issue executive orders governing the 
RMOs’ process, like the executive 
orders presidents routinely issue 
governing OIRA’s process. Ideally 
these executive orders would make 
the process more transparent and in 
so doing would create a degree of 
ownership by the President of the 
whole system. Both steps would 
increase accountability. OMB itself 
could do more to make its process 
more transparent, in the same way 
that OIRA has implemented a regula-
tory dashboard to improve the public 
information f low about the process of 
regulatory review.
But presidential administrations 
have incentives to maintain opacity, 
so other reforms outside the executive 
branch are important as well. For 
its part, Congress should pay more 
attention to the intra-executive budget 
process and ask more questions about 
it. Congress could, for example, 
require the political appointees who 
run each RMO but who are not 
Senate confirmed to testify about their 
budget and policy work. Congress 
could also make these positions Senate 
confirmed. There would be a lot of 
drawbacks to doing so, but there could 
also be some countervailing benefits 
in terms of oversight. History suggests 
that Congress could well take this 
project on; when President Nixon 
began to use OMB in politicized 
ways, for example, Congress reacted in 
part by making more OMB positions 
Senate confirmed.
Civil-society organizations also 
have an important role to play as 
watchdogs of OMB. These orga-
nizations should start paying closer 
attention to seemingly obscure budget 
instructions coming from the OMB 
director. They should try to get 
Congress to conduct more oversight 
of the budget process. And they 
should include RMO staff in their 
lobbying as they do Congress, agency 
officials, and OIRA.
Understanding the work of the 
RMOs also casts doubt on a reform 
proposal critics have sometimes 
offered about OIRA: that it has 
become too powerful and ought to be 
cut back, returning final rulemaking 
authority to agencies. The RMOs’ 
existence demonstrates why such a 
reform would not have the desired 
outcome. OIRA’s process is vastly 
more transparent than the similarly 
expansive budget process. If OIRA’s 
work were cut back, the budget 
process could easily take it up, while 
driving the reality of OMB’s control 
further underground.
Paul O’Neill, a former deputy 
director of OMB, once explained 
that policy debates are “ref lected, 
recorded, and battled over” in budget 
numbers and that “the numbers are 
the keys to the doors of everything.” 
The administrative law community 
ought to pay much more attention to 
how these keys operate.  
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state, and local legislative bodies. Administrative Law 
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